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Ballistic missile defence and the politics of testing: the case of the US Ground-




One of the arguments of the Bush administration for the early deployment of a 
Ballistic Missile Defence system was not only that this would provide some 
limited defensive capability, but also that it would facilitate ‘learning by doing’. 
In practice, however, this ‘capability-based’ deployment has failed to facilitate 
such technological advancement. Instead of enabling the improvement of the 
technology, early deployment, coupled with a series of flight-test failures, has led 
to a shift towards less demanding tests. Deployment has actually proved 
counterproductive because the need for the tests to be successful ‘public 
experiments’ has overridden any significant progression to more realistic testing. 
Introduction 
 
Much of the discourse around US plans for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and 
much of the opposition to such a system, has focused on the issue of technical 
feasibility. Put bluntly, the question that is typically asked is: will it work? Is it 
technically possible to build a system that can defend the US against nuclear-
armed ballistic missiles? Given (thankfully) the lack of operational experience, 
most of the weight of claims for efficacy rests on the results of testing. Flight-
testing, in particular, has assumed a heavy responsibility as the means by which 
the performance of BMD technology is judged. 
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A key issue is whether the number and nature of tests is adequate to provide 
credible evidence that BMD would achieve the operational performance that is 
claimed. Opponents of BMD have argued that not only are the test results not 
very good, but also that the design of the tests is insufficiently similar to realistic 
conditions of use. Supporters of BMD, on the other hand, claim that the 
technology is so important that it should be developed and deployed even if the 
evidential basis for performance claims is limited. Moreover, they argue that 
further development and deployment is the only way to build up experience of 
the technology, and thus gain more knowledge about its performance. As BMD 
supporter Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona put it: ‘You can only do so 
much hypothetical testing’ (Quoted in Hulse and Broad, 2004). The important 
thing, BMD proponents argue, is to get ‘rubber on the road’ by deploying 
something, not only gaining experience, but also demonstrating that the US is no 
longer prepared to follow a policy of being defenceless against nuclear attack 
(McMahon, 1997, 226-227). 
 
This is not a new debate; the case for early deployment, and for the benefits of 
‘learning by doing’ (Arrow, 1962), were also made in the first phase of BMD 
development – concerning what was then known as Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
technology.  General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the 
same argument with relation to the Nike Zeus ABM system: ‘Had we crashed 
[speeded up] the Zeus program we would at least have accomplished two things. 
One, we would now be learning by doing. As far as my experience goes with 
new weapons, that is the only way you can make any great progress. It takes a 
considerable amount of actual employment of weapons systems to get the best 
out of them’ (Quoted in Yaneralla, 1997, 93). 
 
Although Nike Zeus was not deployed, its more capable successor, Nike X, 
comprised the technical basis for the Safeguard ABM system that was declared 
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operational in October 1975. Again the argument was made that deployment 
would provide a way ‘to check out the entire system under realistic conditions 
and work out the problems that inevitably arise in the deployment of any new 
major weapon system’ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969, 3). In practice, 
this did not happen because Safeguard had an operational life of only a few 
months, with Congress voting to deactivate the system due to its widely 
acknowledged shortcomings. In that instance, early deployment proved far from 
beneficial, particularly given that - as is clear from documents in the Nixon 
archivesi - hardly anyone in the government, the armed services, or the 
contractor building the system thought it would be effective. 
 
Over thirty years later, the argument is again being made for early deployment 
of BMD technology. Again, however, this appears problematic. The dilemma for 
flight-testing of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) technology now 
deployed in Alaska and California is that the tests have to do two things at once. 
They are what Collins (1988) has called ‘public experiments’, with both the 
general public, and more specifically politicians in Congress, providing 
audiences that need convincing that missile defence is both feasible and value for 
money. At the same time, however, flight-tests are a key tool for the developers 
of the technology, providing empirical feedback on performance that is 
unobtainable from simulation or ground-testing of individual components. 
 
With flight-testing having such a high profile in the debate over the technical 
feasibility of BMD, testing is highly political, with a tension between fear of 
failure and knowledge advancement. On the one hand, the public and political 
attention given to test results has led the Missile Defense Agency to adopt a 
conservative approach to flight-testing in the hope of avoiding too many failures.  
On the other hand, however, this means that the tests are less stressing, yielding 
fewer knowledge gains to aid technology development.  
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This paper will describe the origins and development of the US Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, and in particular, its flight-testing 
programme. Deployment of this system was instigated by the administration of 
G. W. Bush in 2002, and as of January 2008 there were 21 interceptor missiles 
installed in Alaska and 3 in California.ii Other parts of the system are still under 
development and the overall operational readiness of the system is questionable, 
although it was claimed to have been raised to operational status when North 
Korea planned to carry out missile testing in the summer of 2006 (Gard and 
Isaacs, 2006). 
 
Early Developments in Ballistic Missile Defence Technology 
 
BMD technology is very challenging because the reentry vehicles from 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) travel at velocities of around 7km/s or 
15,700 mph (see Weiner, 1984, for an excellent introduction to the topic). Ballistic 
missile defence thus has to function within a demanding timeframe, especially if 
political authority is required to give the go-ahead, and high guidance accuracy 
is required to intercept the reentry vehicles. Early US BMD systems mitigated 
guidance limitations through the use of nuclear warheads on the interceptor 
missiles. These warheads were optimized to emit nuclear radiation that would 
render incoming enemy warheads ineffective. Ground-based radars were 
designed to detect and track the reentry vehicles and also to guide the 
interceptor missiles close enough for the radiation from the nuclear warhead to 
disable the enemy warheads. 
 
This ABM technology was deployed by the US in the Safeguard system that was 
declared operational in 1975, but closed down within months.  By then the ABM 
Treaty, agreed by the USA and Soviet Union in May 1972 and amended in 1974, 
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had limited each nation to just one ABM site. Rather than being the first step on 
which further advances could be based, as the US Army had hoped, the 
Safeguard site at Grand Forks, North Dakota was widely accepted as being 
ineffectual, as well as expensive. Amongst the reasons for Safeguard’s dwindling 
support, even within the Army – along with doubts about whether it would 
work - were concerns about the wisdom of using nuclear warheads as part of the 
defence.iii This had contributed to public disquiet about ABM deployment, 
especially in the earlier incarnation known as Sentinel that was to be deployed 
near cities, but it also concerned the military. It was thought likely the defence’s 
own nuclear detonations could blind the defensive radars - probably the biggest 
weakness of Safeguard was its reliance on a small number of radars - and also 
might prevent the launch of the US Minuteman missiles that it was supposed to 
be protecting. 
 
Following the demise of Safeguard, the US Army pursued a different approach 
to BMD. As early as the 1960s studies showed the potential for using infra-red to 
detect objects against the very cold background of space. These studies indicated 
that it should be possible to ‘see’ reentry vehicles at distances of over a thousand 
miles using telescopes based on infra-red sensitive semiconductors (Davis, 1997). 
Using homing guidance, such technology offered the possibility of a defence 
based on ‘hit-to-kill’, in which the defensive interceptors physically collide with 
the incoming warheads. Although very challenging, this approach had the great 
benefit of not involving nuclear warheads. Indeed, no explosive at all is required 
because the collision of even small masses at such high velocities is highly 
destructive. 
 
Strategic hit-to-kill (i.e. of intercontinental range missiles) was first demonstrated 
in the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) tests carried out in 1983-84 (Mann, 
198x). Although only the last of these four test flights was considered fully 
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successful, the overall impression given by HOE was that hit-to-kill was feasible. 
However, this approach was then marginalised in the rush to develop more 
exotic technologies and approaches in President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). In particular, Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger 
had a ‘strong desire … not to let the programme sink back into a familiar mode 
of solely ground-based, largely ineffective, defensive systems’ (Weinberger, 1990, 
221). 
 
Nevertheless, a second phase of hit-to-kill tests was carried out in 1991-92 in the 
Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS) programme, with a 
success rate of one out of two flight tests.iv Although SDI continued to favour 
space-based approaches such as Brilliant Pebbles, the purported successv of the 
Patriot in the first Gulf War of early 1991 had a significant impact on the US 
political mood in relation to missile defence (McMahon, 106-107). Two ‘lessons’ 
of this experience were significant. First, that missile defence could provide some 
protection from attack, and even if not perfect, it would be better to have it than 
not. Second, that deterrence would not necessarily prevent attack; just as Iraq 
was not deterred from attacking US forces based in the Gulf, so, perhaps, North 
Korea would not be deterred from attacking the US. Although, the performance 
of Patriot was later judged to be very poor (Postol, 1991/92), and the relevance of 
the Iraqi example to threats involving the use of nuclear weapons against the 
USA was questionable, the episode prompted a bipartisan Congressional shift 
towards support for ‘hit-to-kill’ BMD. Republican missile defence supporters in 
the Congress were able to build a consensus around the perceived lessons of the 
Gulf War, but without recourse to the politically divisive space-based technology 
of Star Wars. 
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National Missile Defence Development and Testing under Clinton 
 
Further impetus for missile defence came during the Clinton administration as 
the concern over the missile threat posed by ‘rogue states’ rose up the political 
agenda (Graham, 2001). Such arguments became hard to resist when the 
Democrats lost control of the Congress in the 1994 mid-term elections. In 1995 
Congress passed a Ballistic Missile Defense Act that specified that deployment of 
a BMD to defend the US should begin in 2003. Although unenthusiastic, the 
Clinton administration agreed to a ‘three-plus-three’ plan whereby a National 
Missile Defense (NMD) system should be demonstrated in (roughly) three years 
with the potential then to deploy if necessary within another three years 
(Graham, 2001, 27).  
 
Such a demonstration of feasibility was seen to hinge on the performance of 
flight-tests. Earlier test programmes had been seen as demonstrating that it was 
possible to ‘hit a bullet with a bullet’, to use the usual analogy, but two main 
issues remained a concern. For one thing, the combined success rate for HOE and 
ERIS was 2 out of 6, and a system with such a one in three chance of hitting the 
target would be unacceptable for a deployed defence.  
 
The other issue, however, is more fundamental to disputes over performance 
claims for BMD. Hitting a re-entry vehicle in a flight-test is an impressive 
achievement, but the critical issue is whether the conditions of such tests are 
sufficiently realistic. That is to say, confidence in the system hinges on 
judgements of similarity between the flight-tests and ‘real-life’ use (MacKenzie, 
1989).   Typically, in a flight-test the nature of the target, any accompanying 
decoys or other countermeasures, and their time and direction of attack are all 
known to the defence. Moreover, to date, most tests have used decoys that are 
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relatively easy to distinguish from the target re-entry vehicle or no decoys at all 
(Gronlund et al, 1994). As Paul Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense for 
acquisition and technology from 1994 to 1997, put it: ‘We can make a bullet hit a 
bullet. We can demonstrate that under ideal conditions. The next step is to move 
from hitting, not occasionally, but to hit routinely under stressful operational 
conditions’ (Quoted in Weiner, 1997). 
 
NMD flight-testing was carried with interceptors based on the Kwajalein atoll in 
the Marshall Islands, and using radars and other sensors based there. The target 
objects, typically a reentry vehicle and some decoys, were carried by missiles 
launched from the Vandenberg Air Base in California, about 7500 km away 
(Gronlund et al, 1994). These target reentry vehicles carried either a GPS receiver 
and transmitter or a C-band beacon (for use with a C-band radar on Hawaii) or 
both because no suitable radar could track the early stages of flight unassisted. 
Interceptor launch was initiated and guided by information from these sources, 
but the final homing of the kill vehicle (known as the exo-atmospheric kill 
vehicle or EKV) was autonomous. As it approaches the target cluster (the reentry 
vehicle, remnants of the missile, and any decoys and countermeasures), the EKV 
compares the infrared signatures of the objects it can see and uses discrimination 
algorithms to choose its target. 
 
The first two Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs 1A and 2) were ‘fly-by’ tests aimed at 
demonstrating the performance of the system, and particularly the competing 
kill vehicle designs of Boeing and Raytheon, but with no attempt to intercept the 
target reentry vehicle. Carried out in June 1997 and January 1998 respectively, 
these tests collected data as the kill vehicle viewed the dummy warhead and its 
accompanying decoys, which comprised both a number of different sized 
balloons and conical, reentry vehicle-shaped, decoys (Coyle, 2000). 
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Although not intended to achieve intercepts these fly-by tests were to be 
significant for future test plans, leading to a major controversy over the 
capability of the kill vehicle to discriminate between decoys and actual reentry 
vehicles, and whether the tests were a realistic test of such a capability. At the 
heart of this controversy was the decision by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office 
to reduce the number and complexity of decoys used in subsequent flight tests. 
 
Critics argue that this decision stemmed from the realization that the kill 
vehicle’s discrimination algorithms could not distinguish between realistic 
decoys and the actual reentry vehicle (Postol, 2000). Certainly, whatever the 
reason, decoys that have been used in subsequent flight tests have had markedly 
different signatures from the target reentry vehicle. This was confirmed by Philip 
Coyle, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, in 
Congressional testimony in September 2000: ‘Signature simulations show that 
since the large balloon and deployment bus have infrared (IR) signatures very 
dissimilar to the MRV [medium reentry vehicle], the EKV can easily discriminate 
the MRV from these objects’ (Coyle, 2000). 
 
The final three flight-tests carried out during the Clinton administration, IFTs 3 
to 5, aimed to intercept the target reentry vehicle, with only one reported success, 
in the first attempt on 2 October, 1999. The second attempt, IFT 4, on 18 January, 
2000, was unable to home on the target because of a failure with the plumbing of 
the cooling system required to get the infrared seeker down to a sufficiently low 
temperature to enable it to distinguish the infrared signature of the target from 
background noise. IFT 5 on 8 July, 2000 also failed, in this instance because the 
kill vehicle did not separate from the booster (Graham, 2001, 199-200, 299-303). 
 
With only one hit out of three attempts Clinton was able to argue that the 
technology was too immature to make a decision to deploy, and in September 
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2000 he decided to defer a deployment decision, leaving the matter open for the 
next administration (Graham, 2001, 328-331). The President said that he did not 
have ‘enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of 
the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment’ (Quoted in Gronlund 
et al, 2000). 
 
Of course, it could be argued that even had there been three perfect intercepts 
this would hardly have constituted a sufficient case for a deployment decision. 
The tests were acknowledged to be not very challenging of discrimination 
capability. According to Major General Willie Nance, the program executive 
officer for the ground-based missile defence: ‘I will tell you that these are not 
stressing discrimination tests. We don’t intend that. These tests are principally 
focused on demonstrating we could do hit to kill’ (Quoted in Gronlund et al, 
2004, 16). 
 
Indeed according to Congressional testimony by Pentagon test director Coyle the 
test programme was not designed to support an immediate deployment 
decision, but rather to add to the knowledge base for the technology: 
 
 11
The testing program has been designed to learn as much as 
possible from each test. Accordingly, the tests so far have all been 
planned with backup systems so that if one portion of a test fails, 
the rest of the test objectives might still be met. Developmental tests 
in a complex program, especially those conducted very early, 
contain many limitations and artificialities, some driven by the 
need for specific early design data and some driven by test range 
safety considerations. Additionally, the tests are designed so that 
they will not produce debris in orbit that will harm satellites. Also, 
the program was never structured to produce operationally 
realistic test results this early. Accordingly, it was not realistic to 
expect these test results could support a full deployment decision 
now, even if all of the tests had been unambiguously successful, 
which they have not been (Coyle, 2000). 
 
Missile Defence under G. W. Bush  
 
Once elected, the Bush administration quickly increased funding for missile 
defencevi, and in December 2001 made the significant step of announcing US 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, to take effect six months later on June 13, 2002. 
Without the constraints of the ABM Treaty the US was free to deploy missile 
defence systems of whatever type and number it decided, and at any locations. 
The NMD technology was renamed as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) and made the centerpiece of US BMD efforts. These were reorganized, 
bringing all the main service activities (for example, the Army’s Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense Program, the Navy’s ship-based Aegis system, and the 
Air Force’s airborne laser, amongst others) under the control of the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA), as the Ballistic Missile Defense Office was renamed.vii 
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MDA’s initial plan was to construct a ‘Test Bed’ in Alaska, with the rationale that 
this would enable more realistic testing: ‘How do you realistically test an 
enormous and complex system, one that covers eight time zones and engages 
enemy warheads in space? The answer is that we have to build it as we would 
configure it for operations in order to test it. That is exactly what we are doing by 
building our test bed and putting it on alert this year’ (Kadish, 2004). 
 
This viewpoint was also supported by the new Pentagon test director, Thomas 
Christie, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee that: ‘The test bed, 
including missiles, will provide an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground 
test data on intra- and interoperability between the command and control center 
and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile health and status or 
built in testing capability; and on system safety, reliability, maintainability and 
logistics supportability. It will also permit us to get an early start on collecting 
data on aging effects on the missile’ (Christie, 2003). 
 
The test bed was to include interceptor missiles based in silos at Fort Greely on 
the Alaska mainland, as well as on Kodiak Island, and upgrades to the Cobra 
Dane and Beale radars located in Alaska and California. Along with the 
necessary communications and battle management facilities, this test bed would 
not only ‘provide us with an excellent capability to test the integrated Ballistic 
Missile Defense System against more challenging targets under more realistic 
flight conditions’, but also ‘may have some capability to defend against an actual 
threat in a real attack’ (Christie, 2003). 
 
Critics, however, saw the test bed development as simply an excuse to begin 
work on BMD deployment. They argued that the test bed was not suited to 
realistic testing of the GMD system. In particular, the interceptors based at Fort 
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Greely could not be used for test purposes because missile flights over US 
territory were banned for range safety reasons. Nor was the fixed orientation 
Cobra Dane radar directed towards the test range (Gronlund et al 2004, 7).  
 
In fact, during the first two years of the Bush administration testing of the GMD 
system followed a similar pattern to that followed under Clinton for NMD. As 
before these tests were carried out with interceptors based at Kwajalein against 
targets launched from California, but with initially much greater success. All of 
the first four attempted intercepts (IFTs 6 to 9) – carried out during 2001 and 2002 
- were reported as direct hits. Of these, IFT-8 was the first GMD intercept flight 
test to incorporate more than one decoy, with the large balloon used previously 
supplemented by two small balloons.  
 
MDA Director Kadish described the approach thus: ‘Our test philosophy is to 
add step-by-step complexities over time such as countermeasures and operations 
in increasingly stressful environments. This approach allows us to make timely 
assessments of the most critical design risk areas. It is a walk-before-you-run, 
learn-as-you-go development approach.’ In particular, Kadish stressed that ‘if we 
were to rush to add complexity to our flight tests … a test failure would make it 
very difficult to identify the actual cause of failure.’ According to Kadish: ‘Our 
test evaluators cannot learn by overloading system components with multiple 
test requirements and testing them too early under highly stressing conditions’ 
(Kadish, 2001; see also Broad, 2001). 
 
Everything thus seemed to be going to plan; a plan in which, according to 
Kadish, the ‘testing program is designed to become increasingly realistic. … The 
tests become progressively more stressful, involving, among other things, greater 
discrimination challenges, longer ranges, higher closing speeds, and day and 
nighttime shots’ (Kadish, 2001). However, this apparently smooth transition in 
 14
testing would not play out quite so ideally, and to a large extent the problem was 
self-inflicted as the Bush administration precipitated its own ‘rush to failure’, to 
use the words of a earlier review of the Clinton NMD programme.viii 
 
Ironically, it was the decision by President Bush to push ahead with BMD 
deployment that would mark the end of any semblance of a smooth progression 
through increasing degrees of testing realism. On December 17, 2002 President 
Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 23 directing that the US 
begin deployment of a ground-based BMD system that would reach initial 
operational status in 2004 (Gronlund et al, 2004, 1). Based around GMD 
technology, the plan was to have 10 interceptor missiles in place by the end of 
2004, with the intention of providing protection against missiles launched from 
Northeast Asia and the Middle East.  
A Capability-based System 
 
The Bush administration’s plans for BMD deployment turned the Clinton 
concern with technological feasibility on its head. Instead of tying a decision to 
deploy to meeting a particular performance threshold, the Bush approach was to 
deploy whatever capability was possible, and then to build on this initial 
deployment with further improvements. This was known as a ‘capability-based’ 
approach, and the further improvements were to be implemented through was 
what called ‘spiral development’ - a term borrowed from software development 
(Coyle, 2003; see also Samson and Schwellenbach, 2008).  
According to MDA Director Kadish, ‘The President’s direction recognizes that 
the first systems we field will have a limited operational capability. He directed 
that we field what we have, then improve what we have fielded. The President 
thus codified in national policy the principle of Evolutionary, Capability-Based 
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Acquisition and applied it to missile defense’ (Kadish, 2004). Kadish put the best 
light on this approach by stressing its flexibility: ‘A capability-based approach 
relies on continuing and comprehensive assessments of the threat, available 
technology, and what can be built to do an acceptable job, and does not 
accommodate a hard requirement that may not be appropriate’ (Kadish, 2004). 
During congressional hearings, Republican Senator John Cornyn from Texas, 
supported the White House move: ‘If we waited until we went through a 
traditional test and operation before we then concerned ourselves with possibly 
deploying these in the case of emergency, it really might be too late’ (Quoted in 
Fryer, 2005). 
The potential for ‘learning by doing’ was also stressed as one of the benefits of 
early deployment. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that: ‘In the 
case of missile defense, I think we need to get something out there, in the 
ground, at sea, and in a way that we can test it, we can look at it, we can develop 
it, we can evolve it, and find out – learn from the experimentation with it’ 
(Quoted in Firestone, 2003).  
It was recognized that the initial capability offered by such a defence might be 
limited, but argued that it was better than nothing. Even if its effectiveness was 
in doubt, it was claimed that the deployment of a limited BMD capability could 
serve a purpose because it would complicate ‘a prospective opponent’s 
calculation of success, adding to his uncertainty and weakening his confidence’ 
(Lucas Fischer, deputy assistant of state for strategic affairs speaking to Danish 
parliament, quoted in Gordon and Myers, 2001). Kadish also stated that: ‘I must 
emphasize that what we do in 2004 and 2005 is only the starting point—the 
beginning—and it involves very basic capability. Our strategy is to build on this 
beginning to make the BMD system increasingly more effective and reliable 
against current threats and hedge against changing future threats’ (Kadish, 2004). 
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The Special Status of the GMD System 
 
The urgency felt for BMD deployment also meant that the Bush administration 
accorded the programme special status. In January 2002 Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld directed that BMD would be exempt from the Operational 
Requirements Documents and other requirements that might impede rapid 
decisions and progress (Canavan, 2003, 77). This meant for example that MDA 
had ‘unique flexibility to make changes to its strategy – including revising its 
goals or making trade-offs among the seven BMDS elements – without 
necessarily having to seek prior approval from a higher-level DOD acquisition 
executive, as most other major acquisition programs are required to do’ (GAO, 
2006, 4.).  
MDA was able ‘to effectively defer the application of DOD acquisition 
regulations’ (GAO, 2006, 31). So long as any element of BMD is not transferred to 
a military service for ‘production, operation, and sustainment’, MDA has 
discretion to vary the pace of development, and trade-off one BMD capability 
against another. Nor were BMD elements required to meet the normal ‘cost and 
schedule estimates and formal performance requirements’ mandated by statute 
for a major acquisition programme (GAO, 2006, 32). 
 
The on-going development status of the initial BMD deployment also meant that 
MDA avoided conforming with regulations requiring operational testing of US 
weapons system prior to moving to production. This ‘fly-before-you-buy’ 
approach was first proposed by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in 
the early 1970s, and an independent office to oversee this was finally established 
in 1983, with the creation of the office of the Director, Operational Testing and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) in the Department of Defense. Reporting both to the 
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Secretary of Defense and Congress, DOT&E is responsible for overseeing the 
operational testing of major weapons systems. 
 
This testing should be carried out across a range of realistic operational 
conditions using standard equipment and conducted by the Service Operational 
Test Agencies overseen by the DOT&E.ix Major weapons acquisition programs 
should not move beyond what is known as a ‘low rate of initial production’ 
(LRIP) until this operational testing has been carried out and evaluated by the 
DOT&E in a ‘beyond-LRIP report’ (Sessler et al, 2000, 92). 
 
However, the initial Block 2004 deployment was not considered to involve a full-
scale production decision and so was not seen as requiring a full assessment of 
its operational effectiveness. As the GAO noted in 2003, the Block 2004 GMD ‘is 
not connected with a full-rate production decision that would clearly trigger 
statutory operational testing requirements’ (GAO, 2003a, 19-20). 
 
The Block 2004 GMD Deployment  
 
Block 2004 was originally planned to provide an initial capability, known as 
Limited Defensive Operations (LDO), by the end of September 2004, with five 
GMD interceptor missiles based at Fort Greely in Alaska. Early warning and 
tracking would be provided by the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, 
and the upgraded Cobra Dane and Beale radars, along with Navy Aegis 
surveillance and tracking ships based in the Sea of Japan. As well as GMD and 
Aegis, Block 2004 was to incorporate a third element of the MDA’s BMD 
technology developments, the Command, Control, Battle Management and 
Communications (C2BMC) system. Although these BMD capabilities were in 
place by the LDO date, the system was not officially activated (GAO, 2005, 13). 
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By the end of Block 2004 (the end of 2005) a further 15 interceptors were to be 
deployed at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, a sea-
based X-band radar (SBX) was to be deployed, and Aegis ships were to provide 
some interceptors as well as radar coverage. Further radar coverage was also to 
be provided from the upgraded Fylingdales BMEWS in England.  
 
In fact, GMD interceptor emplacement did not meet this planned schedule. Five 
interceptors were emplaced at Fort Greely by the LDO of September 2004, but 
only four more interceptors (two at Fort Greely and two at Vandenberg) were 
fielded in FY2005. One problem causing this delay centred on technical 
difficulties with the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV); another set-back resulted 
from an explosion at a facility producing motors for one of the boosters (see 
GAO, 2006, 10-11 and 19). By the end of 2005 a total of ten GMD interceptors 
were in place, rather than the twenty originally planned (GAO, 2006, 19). 
 
Radar developments also failed to match the original goals of Block 2004 (GAO, 
2006, 20, 46, 50). The Forward-Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) radar had 
completed development, but negotiations with the host nation, Japan, were not 
completed in time. Both Cobra Dane and Beale radars were ready for operation, 
but there were doubts about software deficiencies and lack of testing. The use of 
Aegis ship-based radars for surveillance and tracking in support of GMD 
interception also remained untested. Two GMD tests were planned to include 
Aegis, but this did not occur in IFT-13C due to bad weather conditions or in IFT-
14 due to fleet scheduling conflicts (GAO, 2006, 48). As it happened these tests 
failed anyway (see below) and the subsequent rescheduling of the GMD flight 
test programme has not included any use of Aegis. 
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(Not) Testing Through Failure 
 
Ironically, the decision to deploy the GMD system coincided with a long hiatus 
in flight-testing. Up to that point MDA’s approach to testing, as enunciated by 
MDA Director Kadish in 2001, was to ‘test-though-failure’ (Quoted in Wall, 2004, 
30). Indeed, Kadish extolled the benefits of learning from failure: 
 
We expect steady progress toward success, even though we 
anticipate we will have test failures–failures are an inevitable part 
of the development process. Given the integrated approach we 
desire to take with our missile defenses, and given that many 
technologies can be shared among the different BMD systems, 
success for one is success for all. And likewise, the failures we 
experience in one test can provide lessons learned applicable to all 
BMD development programs. Indeed, from my standpoint, if we 
do not fail occasionally, we are not pushing the envelope 
sufficiently (Kadish, 2001). 
 
In practice, this sanguine view of failure proved very short-lived. Following the 
failure of test flight IFT-10 on 11 December 2002 the policy of testing through 
failure was abruptly dropped and there would not be another attempted 
intercept flight test until December 2004, and a successful intercept would not be 
achieved until 1 September 2006. 
 
IFT-10 failed because the EKV did not separate from the booster due to a broken 
pin in an integrated circuit. This was caused by vibration induced fatigue and 
had not been observed in earlier flights because foam material had been used to 
reduce the severity of the flight vibration (GAO, 2006, 27). Most of the flight-tests 
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planned for 2003 and 2004 were then postponed (Wall, 2004, 30). IFT-13C in 
December 2004 failed due to a timing problem with the interceptor flight 
computer that meant it did not launch (GAO, 2006, 51).x 
 
IFT-13C was considered ‘of particular significance because it was to have 
demonstrated operational aspects of the LDO capability for the first time in a 
flight test environment’ (GAO, 2005, 16). IFT-13C was the first flight test to use 
the same technology (hardware and software) that was being used in the initial 
deployment. Rather than a surrogate booster and prototype kill vehicle as used 
in previous tests, IFT-13C used the operational kill vehicle along with an Orbital 
Sciences booster. Described as a ‘zero-offset flyby’, IFT-13C did not have 
interception of the target as a test objective, but no action would be taken to 
prevent an intercept occurring. In addition, IFT-13C was also planned to 
incorporate the use of Aegis as a fire-control radar, both tracking the target and 
providing the information to generate the flight plan for the interceptor. 
However, as it happened, even before the launch failure, the use of Aegis was 
cancelled due to poor weather (GAO, 2005, 16). 
 
Only one of the planned intercept flight-tests (IFT-14 in February 2005) was 
carried out, with another failure; this time the interceptor missile failed to launch 
due to corrosion and out-of-date equipment in the silo (GAO, 2006, 27). As a 
result the next two intercept flight-tests were postponed as the GMD programme 
was rescheduled (GAO, 2006, 11). The failure of IFT-14 was particularly 
significant because this test had been identified by the GAO as key to 
demonstrating that a number of critical technologies were sufficiently mature to 
move to product development. This technology readiness level (TRL 7, on a scale 
of 1 to 9) requires that ‘a pre-production prototype of the technology must be 
demonstrated to its expected functionality in an operational environment’ (GAO, 
2003b, 10-11). Three critical technologies were expected to be demonstrated in 
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IFT-14: the on-board discrimination capabilities of the EKV; the guidance, 
navigation, and control technology of the EKV, including the inertial 
measurement unit and divert hardware; and the in-flight interceptor 
communications system which provides the boosters with information required 
to attain the desired flight path to put the EKV on an intercept trajectory (GAO, 
2003b, 12-15). 
 
The 2005 Independent Review Team 
 
The consecutive failures of flight-tests IFT 10, 13C and 14 led MDA Director Lt. 
General Henry A. ‘Trey’ Obering (who had taken over from Kadish in July 2004) 
to instigate an Independent Review Team (IRT) in February 2005.xi The main 
recommendation of the IRT report, submitted at the end of March, was that the 
GMD programme should enter a new phase that they called ‘The Performance 
and Reliability Verification Phase’. In particular, the IRT recommended that 
‘mission assurance becomes the highest priority objective’, and stressed the 
importance of successful tests in sending ‘a strong message to adversaries of the 
US, who might be dissuaded by the effectiveness of the system from investing 
further in ballistic missiles and/or be deterred from attacking the US, our 
deployed forces, our allies, and friends’ (IRT, 2005, 4 & 7). In other words, it was 
important to make sure the tests were successful because this determined public 
perception of the capability of the system. 
 
Although each of the three test failures had specific explanations, the IRT 
concluded that there was a general problem with the GMD programme. In 
particular, the demanding schedule for deployment had meant increased risk of 
failures, and the IRT recommended that from then on the test programme should 
be ‘event-driven rather than schedule-driven’ (IRT, 2005, 11). Rather than a 
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mindset of having to ‘prove why should not fly’, the flight readiness process 
should be orientated proactively to one of ‘prove why should fly’ (IRT, 2005, 14).  
Problems should not be addressed narrowly and fixed in isolation, but rather 
should be subject to comprehensive reviews. 
 
A new position – Director, Mission Readiness – was established in the MDA with 
the primary role of examining the GMD test programme, which was restructured 
‘to place more emphasis on successful ground tests prior to each flight’ (GAO, 
2006, 36). A new round of flight-tests started with relatively simple objectives. 
Thus the first test (FT-1) in the restructured schedule, in December 2005, was a 
successful non-intercept test of interceptor operation in space, demonstrating the 
GMD booster launch and the separation of the EKV (GAO, 2006, 11-12, 36). 
 
The next flight-test in the restructured schedule, and the first successful 
interception for almost four years, was carried out on 1 September 2006. This was 
the first GMD intercept test to use an operational radar (in this case Beale) rather 
than a surrogate radar for fire control (GAO, 2006, 52). Even more significant, 
however, was the fact that this test used a different intercept geometry than 
previous tests, with the target missile launched from Kodiak island and the 
interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base (rather than the target from 
Vandenberg and the interceptor from Kwajalein). However, the MDA’s 
sensitivity to political criticism and/or lack of confidence in the technology 
meant that the flight test was advertised not as an intercept attempt, but rather as 
a sensor test: 
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You know, you don’t accidentally hit something. If it was just a fly-
by mission you don’t just, oh gosh, we accidentally hit it! … Well, I 
guess it gets back to, a lot of it is politics, Congress has been, you 
know, especially the Democrats have been jumping up and down 
because there has been a hiatus in the test program.xii 
 
A year later, on 28 September 2007, essentially the same test was successfully 
repeated (although an earlier attempt in May had been aborted due to the failure 
of the target missile to reach the required altitude). However, despite these test 
successes some missile defence supporters continue to criticize the programme 
for what they see as two main failings. First, the promise of spiral development 
has not been sufficiently followed through. Second, although there have been 
recent flight-test successes, these have not been accompanied by increasing 
realism in the design of these tests. 
Lack of Spiral Development 
 
Since the decision was made to deploy the GMD system, MDA has been 
preoccupied with two main tasks: the deployment itself, including the 
construction of interceptor sites, radar modernisation, developing the command 
and control system (with its heavy software demands), and so on; and sorting 
out the problems that were plaguing the flight-test programme. Not surprisingly, 
the updating of the deployed system through spiral development has suffered as 
a consequence. In essence, the system was deployed with the existing limited 
capability, but further improvement has been limited. This has left many 
supporters of missile defence frustrated because it undermines the rationale of a 
capability-based approach: ‘If you want to do capability-based, it logically 
follows you’ve got to spiral development. You can’t do one without doing the 
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other.’xiii Thus in September 2005 the Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-
Committee complained that:  
 
It is particularly troubling that the MDA is taking steps which, if 
continued, will sub-optimize the capability of and investment in 
the GMD element of the ballistic missile defense system. Contrary 
to repeated Defense Department statements on spiral development 
and block upgrades for the missile defense program, MDA at best 
plans only marginal improvements to the capability of the GMD 
program's Ground-based Interceptor. … After many years of 
investment in this midcourse interceptor, MDA has now essentially 
decided that the first generation GBI [ground-based interceptor] 
will also be its last generation GBI (Senate, 2006). 
 
Staunch missile defence supporters have been some of the fiercest critics of the 
lack of spiral development:  
 
Remember we used to have performance requirements that the 
system had to meet. Remember the old-fashioned notion. Well, 
Rumsfeld said to Kadish, you don’t have to do that. We’ll deploy 
because it’s more important to get something out there, something 
rather than nothing. And that’s an argument. OK, so we got 
something out there but we know that it’s not what it should be. 
OK, well, we’re going to do spiral development, we’re going to do 
upgrades every two years and I don’t think we’re doing it, we’re 
not doing it adequately.xiv 
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Moreover, skeptical missile defense supporters have complained about an 
approach that ‘extols the virtue of spiral development without due 
acknowledgment of the importance of adequate testing to demonstrate that the 
product being deployed actually works’ (Orman and Fox, 2007). They point out 
that the MDA’s spiral development approach has led to ‘a relaxation in the 
requirement of how a weapon system will be expected to perform, tending 
toward an acceptance of the capability it produces.’ The consequence of this is 
that:  
 
We have a system based in Alaska and in Vandenberg Air Force 
Base in California, and although some of the elements have been in 
place for more than three years, we do not yet know at what level 
they will perform. How can we determine the best ways to move 
forward without adequate testing? Spiral development may have 
significantly eased the task of developers, but without proper 
testing, it leaves the military services in the unfortunate position of 
being uncertain of how a system will perform (Orman and Fox, 
2007). 
 
Even where spiral development is being carried out, it is at such a slow pace as to 
undermine any claims of operational readiness. Although the MDA was aware 
‘by the end of Block 2004 … that the performance of some Ground-based 
interceptors could be degraded because the interceptors included inappropriate 
or potentially unreliable parts … the process of retrofitting these interceptors … 
will not be completed until 2012’ (GAO, 2008, 35). One disappointed supporter of 
BMD noted that despite the deployment of the GMD interceptors, ‘the current 
missile defense system is in no way sufficient to deal with the range of present 
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and potential ballistic missile threats facing the United States’ (Trachtenberg, 
2006). 
 
Learning by Doing, Fear of Failure, and the Testing Paradox 
 
This lack of spiral development is, of course, closely tied to what has happened 
with flight-testing. A particular problem with the Bush strategy for BMD has 
been that its ‘capability-based’ deployment, predicated on the promise of 
continuous improvement through spiral development, coincided with a period 
of four years without a successful flight-test intercept.  
 
The GMD deployment thus went ahead without the system being validated by 
flight-tests. The 2005 Defense Authorization Act had ‘directed DOD to conduct 
an operationally realistic test of the system by October 1, 2005’ (GAO, 2005, 18), 
but this did not happen. According to MDA Director Kadish the urgency of 
immediate deployment had required the normal procurement approach of ‘fly-
before-you-buy’ to be replaced by one of ‘fly-as-we-buy’ (Wall, 2004, 30). In fact, 
as it turned out, in practice it was rather an approach of ‘buy-before-you-fly’! 
 
However, this lack of flight-testing was not the biggest irony of the Bush 
deployment decision. Paradoxically, deployment also may have undermined the 
role of flight-testing in improving the performance of GMD technology. Flight-
test failures not only meant a long period without a successful intercept, but they 
also stymied the planned progression to more realistic test scenarios. Instead of 
facilitating ‘learning by doing’ the decision to deploy has compromised the 




This undermining of flight-testing has come about because of the role that these 
tests also play as ‘public experiments’ (Collins, 1988). By deploying the GMD 
system the Bush administration made flight-testing more sensitive politically. 
The technical challenges remained the same, but the societal challenges increased 
considerably. The more that the GMD system was portrayed as a deployed, 
operational system, the less tolerant the public and Congress would be of test 
failures. Flight-test failures now became much more significant because each 
failure adds to the perception that the deployed system is ineffective, even 
though BMD development has been costing the US taxpayer around $10 billion a 
year. 
 
The combination of deployment with flight-test failures may thus have led to a 
fear of failure within MDA. Earlier in the programme, MDA Director Kadish had 
stressed that ‘from my standpoint, if we do not fail occasionally, we are not 
pushing the envelope sufficiently’ (Kadish, 2001). However, this philosophy did 
not survive repeated failures, and the recent tendency of MDA has been to avoid 
pushing the envelope in its flight-test design.  
This is significant because flight-tests cannot comprehensively replicate all 
possible operational scenarios. Apart from anything else, the sheer cost of flight-
tests (around $100 million a shot) means that they are limited in number. Range 
safety limitations, and the time it takes to verify a new intercept trajectory, also 
mean that only a few intercept geometries can be flight-tested. This means that to 
date GMD testing has involved many fewer flight-tests than previous 
comparable systems. For example, 165 flight-tests were carried out on the 
development of the interceptor missiles used in the Safeguard BMD system that 
was deployed in 1975 (Coyle, 2000), more than an order of magnitude more than 
those for the NMD/GMD technology.  
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Instead, increasing use has been made of modeling and simulation to carry out 
‘virtual testing’ of the technology, along with ground-testing of components, 
including ‘hardware-in-the-loop’ simulation. According to MDA Director Kadish 
the increasingly sophisticated use of simulation and ground-testing has reduced 
the need for extensive flight-testing: 
The full range of missile defense testing—from our extensive 
modeling and simulation and hardware-in-the-loop tests to our 
ground and flight testing—makes us confident that what we 
deploy will work as intended. We do not rely on intercept flight 
tests to make final assessments concerning system reliability and 
performance. Our flight tests are important building blocks in this 
process, but the significant costs of these tests combined with the 
practical reality that we can only conduct a few tests over any given 
period of time mean we have to rely on other kinds of tests to prove 
the system (Kadish, 2004). 
Thus Major General Chris Anzalone of the MDA described the way flight-testing 
is now used as: ‘Test to verify, not to discover’ (Anzalone, 2006). However, if 
flight-testing is to verify the simulation models then it needs to be done in a 
range of conditions that is as similar as possible to, and as stressing as, 
operational use would be. Not all parts of the performance envelope can be 
explored in testing, but there should certainly be tests of different areas of the 
envelope, especially those that are operationally likely. Instead, most flight-tests 
conducted so far fall into a narrow range of the potential operational envelope as 
regards interceptor range and closing speed (see Coyle, 2000). 
Fear of failure has led MDA to focus its efforts on ensuring flight-tests are 
successful (ie that they hit the target) rather than necessarily useful (ie that they 
might fail to hit the target, but nevertheless provide useful feedback that could 
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lead to improvements). For political reasons the overriding concern has been that 
flight-tests should succeed, not that they provide new data points. In most 
regards recent GMD flight-tests have remained confined to a narrow range of the 
potential operational conditions or have even become less demanding. 
A significant example of this can be seen in the way that MDA has removed any 
decoys or countermeasures from recent tests. None of the GMD intercept tests 
since 2002 have included any decoys or countermeasures (Coyle, 2008, 16; 
Samson, 2008). According to testimony from former Pentagon test director Coyle: 
‘From a target discrimination point of view, during the past five years the flight 
intercept tests have been simpler and less realistic than the tests in the first five 
years’ (Coyle, 2008, 16). 
This goes against the logic of ‘spiral development’ in which the currently 
deployed system would be improved through feedback from progressively 
operationally relevant testing. That should mean testing in a wider range of 
realistic conditions, but this has not happened. For example, to date there has 
been no testing of the GMD system at night (Coyle, 2008, 17), but it can hardly be 
guaranteed that an enemy would overlook the age-old tactic of attacking under 
cover of dark. Given that the success of interception depends on the kill vehicle’s 
ability to discriminate infrared signatures, the absence of sunlight heating of the 
reentry vehicles could be significant. Nor have there been intercept tests against 
tumbling reentry vehicles or against realistic decoys – objects that provide 
infrared signatures that can be difficult to distinguish from real warheads - 
although both these were originally planned to occur in 2001/2002 (Coyle, 2008, 
17). 
There has been one significant broadening of the flight-test envelope with the 
new intercept geometry used in the tests carried out in September 2006 and 
September 2007. Nevertheless, the General Accounting Office’s March 2008 
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assessment of missile defense progress, noted that ‘tests of the GMD element 
have not include target suite dynamic features and intercept geometries 
representative of the operational environment in which GMD will perform its 
mission’ (GAO, 2008, 27). For example, all intercept tests to date have been 
against targets carried on minimum energy (the most efficient) trajectory 
missiles. Although it is well-known that both depressed and lofted trajectories 
can pose special problems for defences, they have not been incorporated into the 
flight-tests. 
Finally, it is important to note that most test failures to date have been due to 
hardware problems and lack of reliability. Discovering such problems cannot be 
done ‘virtually’; it requires real flight-tests. To the extent that flight-test failures 
enable such problems to be discovered and remedied they are an important and 
necessary part of the development process. 
Conclusions 
 
The construction of a defense to protect the USA against ballistic missiles is a 
highly contested issue. Some critics doubt whether the threat is sufficiently great, 
especially given the high opportunity cost of devoting so much money to BMD. 
Others doubt whether the technology can work, and some missile defence 
supporters are much more enthusiastic about an approach based on space-based 
interceptors. 
However, even amongst those who support both the overall goal of BMD and 
the approach of using ground-based interceptors, there remains disquiet about 
the way GMD deployment and testing has proceeded. These critics believe that 
the spiral development essential to the capability-based approach has not been 
followed through, and are surprisingly in agreement with many opponents of 
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BMD (such as the Union of Concerned Scientists) as regards the inadequate 
levels of realism in the flight-testing to date: 
You know, that’s a terrible accusation to make, that they got a 
flimsy system up in Alaska, and the whole theory of it being 
capability based was it’s OK to deploy a system before its 
completed, … but if you don’t follow it up with spiral development 
you’ve kind of defaulted on the contract.xv 
 
This paper argues that there is a tension at the heart of GMD development with 
regards to flight-testing. Ironically, the strong desire of the Bush administration 
for early deployment may have undermined the role that flight-testing can play 
in improving the technology. Because the rush to deploy has created high 
expectations as regards to performance, every flight test now is inevitably a 
‘pubic experiment’. With Congress funding US BMD development to the tune of 
around $10 billion per annum, and with the administration and the MDA 
claiming that the GMD system offers operational capability, there is a natural 
expectation that flight tests will demonstrate such a capability. 
However, as it turned out, the decision to deploy coincided with a long hiatus in 
flight testing and a string of flight test failures, resulting in a period of almost 
four years - October 2002 to September 2006 – without a successful intercept. 
Rather than ‘testing through failure’ as originally planned, the MDA simply 
deployed a system without flight-testing. Moreover, there is concern that fear of 
failure in the flight-test programme means that tests are being designed to 
succeed rather than to learn, before a sufficient amount of learning has been 
achieved to justify claims of operational effectiveness in realistic conditions of 
use. 
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MDA now argues that early problems have been overcome and testing will 
become increasingly demanding. In December 2007 MDA Director Obering 
stated that: ‘What we have to do now is to turn our attention to make sure we 
can fully wring out the system in a variety of operational and realistic scenarios. 
And that is what we will be doing over the next couple of years’. However, 
according to former test Director Phil Coyle: ‘At the rate they are going … it 
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x IFT-13A was a test of Lockheed’s BV+ booster but was postponed because of the production problems. 
IFT-13B was a similar test of the Orbital Sciences booster that was successfully carried out on January 26, 
2004 (delayed from original date of July 2003). 
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